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Abstract
In this paper, we show that all the coordinate functions of the advanced encryption standard (AES)
round function are equivalent under an afﬁne transformation of the input.We also show that such afﬁne
relations will always exist if the AES S-box is replaced by any bijective monomial over GF(28).
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1. Introduction
Rijndael [2,3] is an iterated block cipher that supports key and block lengths of 128–256
bits in steps of 32 bits. Rijndael versions with a block length of 128 bits, and key lengths
of 128,192 and 256 bits have been adopted as the advanced encryption standard (AES) [4].
The main cryptographic criteria in the design of Rijndael have been its resistance against
differential [1] and linear cryptanalysis [12]. This motivated the designers to choose an
S-box which is optimized against these two attacks. In particular, the designers decided to
base their S-box construction on the inversion mapping [15]
f (x)= x−1, x ∈ GF(28).
Because this inverse mapping has a simple algebraic expression that may enable some
attacks such as the interpolation attacks [9,10,16]. This mapping was modiﬁed in such a
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way that does not modify its resistance towards both linear and differential cryptanaly-
sis, while the overall S-box description becomes complex in GF(28). This was achieved
by adding a bitwise afﬁne transformation after the inverse mapping. Let a(x) denote the
ﬁnite ﬁeld polynomial representation of the S-box input, then the ﬁnite ﬁeld polynomial
representation of the output of this afﬁne mapping is given by
b(x)= (x7 + x6 + x2 + x)+ a(x)(x7 + x6 + x5 + x4 + 1)mod (x8 + 1). (1)
Like many other block ciphers, the Rijndael S-boxes provide the only source of nonlin-
earity to the Rijndael round function, and hence to the overall algorithm. Weaknesses dis-
covered with these mappings may have some consequences for the security of the overall
cipher. Even before the AES proposal, Gong and Golomb [8] introduced a new criterion
for S-box design. By showing that many DES-like ciphers can be viewed as a nonlinear
feedback shift register with input, Gong and Golomb proposed that S-boxes should not be
approximated by a bijective monomial. The reason is that, for gcd(c, 2n− 1)= 1, the trace
functions Tr(j xc) and Tr(x), x ∈ GF(2n), are both m-sequences with the same linear
span [7].
Several other concerns were raised about the algebraic structure of the AES [5,14].
Recently, Fuller and Millan [6] showed, using a heuristic search technique, that all the
coordinate functions of the Rijndael S-box can be mapped to each other using an afﬁne
transformation of the input variables. In this paper we extend their result by using the
algebraic properties of the Rijndael S-box. In particular, we show that all the coordinate
functions of the Rijndael round function (and not just the S-box) are equivalent under an
afﬁne transformation of the input to the round function. We also show that such afﬁne
relations will always exist if the Rijndael S-box is replaced by any bijective monomial
over GF(28).
2. Rijndael round transformation
In this section we brieﬂy describe a typical round function of the 128 bit version of
Rijndael. The ﬁrst and last rounds have slightly different form but our analysis procedure
remains the same. The AES deﬁnes a round in terms of the following three transforma-
tions: byte substitution (ByteSub), shift row (ShiftRow) and mix columns (MixColumns).
After performing these three operations, the round keys are XORed with the output of
the round functions. According to the AES speciﬁcations, the intermediate cipher result is
called a state which can be represented by a rectangular array of bytes. The round func-
tion operations are deﬁned on these states. The ByteSub is obtained by ﬁrst taking the
multiplicative inverse in GF(28) using the irreducible polynomial x8 + x4 + x3 + x + 1.
Then we apply the afﬁne transformation deﬁned by Eq. (1) above. In the ShiftRow trans-
formation, the rows of the state are cyclically shifted over different offsets depending on
the cipher block length. For the 128 bit version, row i is cyclically shifted by i bytes,
i = 0, 1, 2, 3. In the MixColumn transformation, the columns of the state are consid-
ered as polynomials over GF(28) and multiplied modulo x4 + 1 with the polynomial
c(x) = 3x3 + x2 + x + 2. For full details on the round transformation the reader is
referred to [3,4].
A.M. Youssef, S.E. Tavares / Discrete Applied Mathematics 148 (2005) 161–170 163
3. Algebraic preliminaries
In this section, we present some algebraic preliminaries required to prove our result. The
reader is referred to [11,13] for the theory of ﬁnite ﬁelds.
Let {0 · · · n−1} be any basis of GF(2n) over GF(2) and let {0 · · ·n−1} be the corre-
sponding dual basis. Let f (x0, . . . , xn−1) = (f0(x), . . . , fn−1(x)) be a permutation over
GF(2)n, then g(x) =∑n−1i=0 ifi(x0, . . . , xn−1) is also a bijective mapping over GF(2n).
Each output coordinate of f (x) can be expressed as
fi(x)= Tr(g(x)i ),
where x =∑n−1i=0 xii . We will denote this one-to-one correspondence by f ←→ g.
Example 1. Let n= 4 and let GF(24) be deﬁned by the primitive polynomial p(x)= x4+
x + 1. Let  be a root of p(x). Then {0, 1, 2, 3} = {1, , 2, 3} is a (polynomial) basis









0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1

 , B = A−1 =


1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0

 .
Hence we have {0,1,2,3}={1+3, 2, , 1}={14, 2, , 1}. Let g(x)=Tr(x−1).
For any x ∈ GF(24), we write x=x0+x1+x22. Then the output coordinates of f ←→ g





Lemma 1. Let g(x) = xd , gcd(d, 2n−1 = 1), be a bijective monomial over GF(2n). Let
h(x0, . . . , xn−1)= L(f (x0, . . . , xn−1)) be the function obtained by applying an invertible
linear transformation L to the output coordinates of f ←→ g. Then the output coor-
dinates of h can be mapped to each other using an afﬁne transformation of the input
coordinates.
Proof. Each output coordinate of f can be expressed as
fi(x)= Tr(xdi ), i ∈ GF(2n).
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bi,jTr(xdi ), bi,j ∈ GF(2).















j x)= Tr(j xd)= hj (x).
The lemma follows by noting that for any  ∈ GF(2n), the transformation x → x over
GF(2n) corresponds to a linear transformation over GF(2)n. 
Example 2. For the function in Example 1, to transform f1 into f3 we use the transform
x → 2x, i.e.,
x0 + x1 + 2x2 + 3x3 → 2(x0 + x1 + 2x2 + 3x3)modp(x)
= x2 + (x2 + x3)+ (x0 + x3)2 + x13,











0 0 1 0
0 0 1 1
1 0 0 1











4. Equivalence between the AES S-box coordinates
In this section, we demonstrate the afﬁne relation between the coordinate functions of the
Rijndael S-box.We construct the ﬁnite ﬁeld GF(28) using the same irreducible polynomial
in the AES speciﬁcations, namely p(x)= x8 + x4 + x3 + x + 1. Let = 1+ , where  is
a root of p(x) (in this case,  is a primitive element). Using the same computation step as










Now suppose that we want to transform f0 into f1, then we use the transformation
x → (166−53)mod 255x = 113x which corresponds to the transformation
(x0 + x1+ · · · + x77) → (x0 + x1+ · · · x77)(1+ )113 modp(x)
= (x0 + x4 + x5)+ (x1 + x4 + x6)+ (x2 + x5 + x7)2
+ (x0 + x3 + x4 + x5 + x6)3 + (x0 + x1 + x6 + x7)4
+ (x1 + x2 + x7)5 + (x2 + x3)6 + (x3 + x4)7
















1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
















5. Equivalence between the AES round function coordinates
In this section, we demonstrate the afﬁne relation between the coordinate functions of
the Rijndael round function. Here we consider the 128 bit version. The same technique
can be used for the other versions of the cipher. We do not use the standard AES way of
representing the input to the round function as a rectangular array. LetXi denote the input to
the ith S-box of the round function, then we simply view the input to the round function as
a column vector. Careful examination of the ShiftRow and MixColumn operations reveals
that every output byte of the round function depends only on 4 input bytes of the 16 input
bytes. In particular, if we let Yi denote the ith output byte of the round function, then we
have
Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3 depends only on X0, X5, X10, X15,
Y4, Y5, Y6, Y7 depends only on X3, X4, X9, X14,
Y8, Y9, Y10, Y11 depends only on X2, X7, X8, X13,
Y12, Y13, Y14, Y15 depends only on X1, X6, X11, X12.
From the description of the round function, it is clear that the byte structure is respected
throughout all three operations of the round function. Combining these observations with
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the fact that both the ShiftRow and MixColumns transformations are linear operations, we
can easily use the Lagrange interpolation to evaluate the exact form of dependency of the
output of the round function on its inputs. Again, let GF(28) be deﬁned by the irreducible
polynomial p(x) = x8 + x4 + x3 + x + 1. Let  = 1 + , where  is a root of p(x).
The following example gives the algebraic representation of the output coordinates for
i = 0, 1, . . . , 7, i = 24, 25, . . . , 31 and i = 120, 121, . . . , 127 (which corresponds to the
outputs of the 1st, 4th and 16th S-boxes).
Example 3.
f0 = Tr(26X−10 )+ Tr(154X−15 )+ Tr(166X−110 )+ Tr(166X−115 )+ 1,
f1 = Tr(154X−10 )+ Tr(100X−15 )+ Tr(53X−110 )+ Tr(53X−115 )+ 1,
f2 = Tr(53X−10 )+ Tr(104X−15 )+ Tr(36X−110 )+ Tr(36X−115 )+ 0,
f3 = Tr(47X−10 )+ Tr(236X−15 )+ Tr(11X−110 )+ Tr(11X−115 )+ 0,
f4 = Tr(44X−10 )+ Tr(237X−15 )+ Tr(72X−110 )+ Tr(72X−115 )+ 0,
f5 = Tr(72X−10 )+ Tr(172X−15 )+ Tr(76X−110 )+ Tr(76X−115 )+ 1,
f6 = Tr(76X−10 )+ Tr(52X−15 )+ Tr(51X−110 )+ Tr(51X−115 )+ 1,
f7 = Tr(51X−10 )+ Tr(27X−15 )+ Tr(26X−110 )+ Tr(26X−115 )+ 0,
f24 = Tr(166X−10 )+ Tr(166X−15 )+ Tr(26X−110 )+ Tr(154X−115 )+ 1,
f25 = Tr(53X−10 )+ Tr(53X−15 )+ Tr(154X−110 )+ Tr(100X−115 )+ 1,
f26 = Tr(36X−10 )+ Tr(36X−15 )+ Tr(53X−110 )+ Tr(104X−115 )+ 0,
f27 = Tr(11X−10 )+ Tr(11X−15 )+ Tr(47X−110 )+ Tr(236X−115 )+ 0,
f28 = Tr(72X−10 )+ Tr(72X−15 )+ Tr(44X−110 )+ Tr(237X−115 )+ 0,
f29 = Tr(76X−10 )+ Tr(76X−15 )+ Tr(72X−110 )+ Tr(172X−115 )+ 1,
f30 = Tr(51X−10 )+ Tr(51X−15 )+ Tr(76X−110 )+ Tr(52X−115 )+ 1,
f31 = Tr(26X−10 )+ Tr(26X−15 )+ Tr(51X−110 )+ Tr(27X−115 )+ 0,
f120 = Tr(166X−11 )+ Tr(166X−16 )+ Tr(26X−111 )+ Tr(154X−112 )+ 1,
f121 = Tr(53X−11 )+ Tr(53X−16 )+ Tr(154X−111 )+ Tr(100X−112 )+ 1,
f122 = Tr(36X−11 )+ Tr(36X−16 )+ Tr(53X−111 )+ Tr(104X−112 )+ 0,
f123 = Tr(11X−11 )+ Tr(11X−16 )+ Tr(47X−111 )+ Tr(236X−112 )+ 0,
f124 = Tr(72X−11 )+ Tr(72X−16 )+ Tr(44X−111 )+ Tr(237X−112 )+ 0,
f125 = Tr(76X−11 )+ Tr(76X−16 )+ Tr(72X−111 )+ Tr(172X−112 )+ 1,
f126 = Tr(51X−11 )+ Tr(51X−16 )+ Tr(76X−111 )+ Tr(52X−112 )+ 1,
f127 = Tr(26X−11 )+ Tr(26X−16 )+ Tr(51X−111 )+ Tr(27X−112 )+ 0.
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A complete listing of the algebraic representation of the 128 output coordinates of the
round function is given in [17].
Now we give an example for how to ﬁnd the transformation matrix used to map one
coordinate function to another.
Example 4. To transform the coordinate function
f31 = Tr(26X−10 )+ Tr(26X−15 )+ Tr(51X−110 )+ Tr(27X−115 )
into
f0 = Tr(26X−10 )+ Tr(154X−15 )+ Tr(166X−110 )+ Tr(166X−115 )+ 1
we use the transformation
X5 = x0 + x1+ · · · + x77 → (26−154)mod 255X5 = 127X5,
X10 = x′0 + x′1+ · · · + x′77 → (51−166)mod 255X10 = 140X10,
X15 = x′′0 + x′′1+ · · · + x′′77 → (27−166)mod 255X15 = 116X15,
or equivalently
x0 + x1+ · · · + x77 → (x1 + x3 + x5 + x6 + x7)+ (x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 + x5)
+ (x2 + x3 + x4 + x5 + x6)2 + (x1 + x4)3
+ (x1 + x2 + x3 + x6 + x7)4
+ (x0 + x2 + x3 + x4 + x7)5
+ (x1 + x3 + x4 + x5)6
+ (x0 + x2 + x4 + x5 + x6)7,
x′0 + x′1+ · · · + x′77 → (x′1 + x′2 + x′3 + x′4 + x′7)+ (x′0 + x′2 + x′5 + x′7)
+ (x′1 + x′2 + x′6)2 + (x′0 + x′1 + x′4)3
+ (x′0 + x′3 + x′4 + x′5 + x′7)4
+ (x′0 + x′1 + x′4 + x′5 + x′6)5
+ (x′0 + x′1 + x′2 + x′5 + x′6 + x′7)6
+ (x′0 + x′1 + x′2 + x′3 + x′6 + x′7)7,
x′′0 + x′′1+ · · · + x′′77 → (x′′0 + x′′1 + x′′5 + x′′7 )+ (x′′0 + x′′2 + x′′5 + x′′6 + x′′7 )
+ (x′′0 + x′′1 + x′′3 + x′′6 + x′′7 )2 + (x′′2 + x′′4 + x′′5 )3
+ (x′′1 + x′′3 + x′′6 + x′′7 )4 + (x′′2 + x′′4 + x′′7 )5
+ (x′′3 + x′′5 )6 + (x′′0 + x′′4 + x′′6 )7.
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The corresponding linear transformation matrix, A, is given inAppendixA. In this case, the
afﬁne constant is equal to 1.
It is clear that replacing the S-box with any other monomial overGF(28)will not change
the form of dependency of the output of the round function on its inputs because we still
can represent the component functions of the S-box as Tr(xd). For all these monomials,
we will have similar expressions as in Example 3 except that the coefﬁcients inside the
trace terms will be different. Thus, a similar equivalence relation will still hold between the
coordinates of the round function.
One should also note that, while the analysis above shows that any two of the coordinates
of the AES round function can be mapped to one another using an afﬁne transformation,
this transformation is not unique for all pairs and hence some care should be exercised when
interpreting the cryptanalytic implication of this result.
6. Conclusions
We showed that all the output coordinates of theAES round function are in the same afﬁne
equivalence class. Although we were not able to utilize this observation to attack the AES
cipher, this observation may raise some concerns regarding the highly structured algebraic
properties of theAES round function. The implication of this result on the cryptanalysis on
the AES remains an open problem.




I − − − − − − − − − − − − − − −
− I − − − − − − − − − − − − − −
− − I − − − − − − − − − − − − −
− − − I − − − − − − − − − − − −
− − − − I − − − − − − − − − − −
− − − − − A5 − − − − − − − − − −
− − − − − − I − − − − − − − − −
− − − − − − − I − − − − − − − −
− − − − − − − − I − − − − − − −
− − − − − − − − − I − − − − − −
− − − − − − − − − − A10 − − − − −
− − − − − − − − − − − I − − − −
− − − − − − − − − − − − I − − −
− − − − − − − − − − − − − I − −
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − I −
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where I denotes the 8 × 8 identity matrix and “−” denotes the zero matrix of the same




0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0






0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1







1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
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